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Abstract—This paper discusses about the challenges, 
advantages and shortcomings of existing solutions in data 
security and privacy in public cloud computing. As in cloud 
computing, oceans of data will be stored. Data stored in public 
cloud would face both outside attacks and inside attacks since 
public cloud provider themselves are untrusted. Conventional 
encryption could be used for storage, however most data in cloud 
needs further computation. Decryption before computation will 
cause large overheads for data operation and lots of 
inconvenience. Thus, efficient methods to protect data security as 
well as privacy for large amount of data in cloud are necessary. 
 In the paper, different mechanisms to protect data security 
and privacy in public cloud are discussed. A data security and 
privacy enabled multi-cloud architecture is proposed.  
 
Keywords— Cloud computing, data confidentiality, data 
privacy, data integrity. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 Cloud computing has become an emerging technique due to 
its on demand service and scalablity features. Most usage of 
cloud today is in data storage and big data or computation-
intensive applications. Thus data security and privacy has 
become the chief concern, especially for business level data. 
Data security mainly includes data confidentiality, availa-bility 
and integrity. Data privacy is to prevent identification of data 
stored in cloud. According to [3], data security and privacy 
issues in cloud exist during the data life cycle from generation, 
transfer, use, share, storage, archival until destruction.  
      Traditional methods for data security usually rely on data 
encryption and access control. Data encryption with AES or 
other encryption methods would prevent valuable infor-mation 
leakage although the adversary gets hold of the data. However 
it has efficiency issue when dealing with oceans of data in 
cloud environment due to large encryption and de-cryption 
overhead in storage and computation.  
 Access control is to prevent unauthorized users to access 
data. However, in cloud computing, users do not have physi-
cal control over the machines they store data on, and also the 
same physical machine could be shared by multiple tenants 
with virtualization, adversary would be able to monitor the 
physical machine behavior to obtain valuable data from other 
tenants [10], and also the cloud providers themselves are 
unreliable, they might accidentally or intentionally mod-ify or 
leak the data stored to adversaries.  
In terms of the particularities of data security in cloud 
computing enviroment, many researches have been done. This 
paper focuses on the protection of the data confidentiali-ty in 
different phases of data life cycle. The paper is organized as 
follows. 
 In Section II, the cloud architecture and possible attacks in 
different points are discussed. In Section III, data security con-
cern and possible attackes during various stages of data life 
cycle in cloud environment will be discussed. In section IV, V 
and VI, various protection methods of data confidentiality, 
availability, integrity and privacy against different kinds of 
attackes will be discussed in details, problems and ad-vantages 
of these different techniques are compared. A new cloud data 
security and privacy enabled architecture and confidentiality 
ranking system are propsed in section VII.. 
. 
II. CLOUD ARCHITECTURE AND SECURITY ISSUES 
      In public cloud environment, threats come from both the 
outsider and insider attack. Fig.1 shows the cloud architecture 
and attacks. The outsider attacks by malicious codes, DDoS 
attack, network eavesdropping etc. There are three layers in 
cloud computing platform. In the infrastructure layer, each 
physical machine has multiple virtual machines (VMs) 
installed. The platform layer provides the platform for 
customers. Customers could have their own applications or 
softwares and configurations installed. And the software layer 
provides the software stacks by the cloud providers. 
       For the client side, a customer could either be a legal user 
or an attacker pretending as legal users. Network 
eavesdroppers could also sit in between to perform man in the 
middle attacks. Firewalls or Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
could be installed to protect the entire cloud environment. 
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Fig. 1. Cloud Infrastructure and Possible attacks in different points 
 
 
Table 1. summarizes the possible attacks and 
solutions. The next few paragraphs discuss about 
possible attacks at different points and protection 
methods in detail. 
 
TABLE 1   ATTACKS IN CLOUD 
Attacks Target and effect Protection methods 
Eavesdropp
ing 
Users. 
key pair for 
authentication would be 
obtained by adversaries 
in the middle 
 
Regular key pair updates, 
multifactor authentication 
Malicious 
Codes 
Users and Cloud 
Provider  
SaaS cloud malicious 
codes in application 
would propagate  
 
Distributed to multiple 
machine instances in the 
same cloud 
Virtual 
Machine 
Users. 
virtual machine storing 
data would be 
compromised 
Virtual machine segregation 
DDoS Users and Cloud 
providers, 
 virtual machine 
instances containing  
Virtual machine migration, 
Virtual Private Cloud 
Insider 
Attacks 
Users, 
 data in cloud would be 
leaked to adversaries 
Distributed storage, 
Encryption 
Data 
Integrity 
Attacks 
Users,  
data in cloud would be 
leaked to adversaries 
General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) , 
Intel SGX 
 
A. Authentication 
Attacks during authentication occur between end users and 
cloud environment. Most public cloud provid-ers today like 
AWS use public/private key for authentication. Users would 
first login to their account with username and password, then 
create and download key pair generated. For further connection 
and authentication to EC2 instances, the key pair is used. 
However network eavesdroppers in the middle would intercept 
the key pair and do cryptoanalysis or man in the middle attack.  
Updating key pair used regularly and using multifactor 
authentication might be helpful in this case. 
B. Virtual Machine Attacks. 
In public cloud, multiple tenants would share the same 
physical machine through virtualization. If adversaries 
pretending as legal users are able to login to the virtual 
machines, they would be able perform attacks for the 
following reasons:  
a) Calls to a virtualized network device would be passed to 
the physical network device. If malicious code is inserted, it 
would propagate and affect other virtual machines on the same 
physical device or even other physical machines. 
b). Adversary might exploit relaxed access control and 
inter VM communication on the same physical machine to 
perform attacks 
C. DDoS attacks. 
       In perspective of cloud providers, it would be hard for at-
tackers to perform DDoS attacks due to huge amounts of 
servers. However, in perspective of users, adversary would be 
able to make the specific servers which contain that user’s 
data unavailable to use if they know the location of data 
residence. One could solve this by live virtual machine 
migration. Also cloud providers like AWS enables Virtual 
Private Cloud (VPC) service for stronger access control 
D. Insider abuse. 
       Unlike in single machine and clusters, machines in cloud 
computing are in possession of cloud providers. Cloud 
providers would clearly know the data contents, location, and 
computation/analytics methods performed over data.  If cloud 
providers collude with adversaries, data stored would be 
exposed. Thus methods to protect data security in untrusted 
cloud providers need to be developed. Several existing 
methods like multiple storage are discussed in the following 
sections. 
III. CLOUD DATA SECURITY CHALLENGES 
As mentioned above, there would be more 
concerns on data security in cloud environment than 
in traditional single ma-chine which are in hold of 
users themselves. In this section, different concerns 
and possible attackes during cloud data usage and 
storage phases are summarized. 
A. Data Use 
Once data is migrated to cloud, cloud providers will 
clearly get hold of everything users transferred to cloud 
machine in-stances. Both adversaries and cloud providers 
themselves might misuse the data stored in cloud. Thus some 
kinds of data transformation might be needed to prevent 
valuable information leakage.  
If cloud is only used for data storage and no further 
operations are needed, simple encryption is feasible. However, 
in most cases, further processing might be needed.  
Users might need to apply certain processing over the data 
stored. For example, computation might be needed like matrix 
multiplication. Also data analytics methods such as ma-chine 
learning algorithms need to be applied for data classification.  
     Data computation and analytics is within the cloud itself. 
However certain use of cloud data will also need the 
interaction between local users and remote cloud. For example, 
users might need to retrieve certain data for modification 
through data querying.   
Concern about the above cloud data usage is described in 
details as follows: 
 
    1). Processing on encrypted data. For data and computation 
intensive applications, the algorithms themselves also reside in 
cloud. Cloud providers could infer from the algorithms what 
kinds of data are stored. Besides, to protect data, the data to be 
processed also need to be encrypted. How to process 
encrypted data without decryption remains a question. 
    2).  Query analytics attack. In cloud environment, large 
volumes of data are stored. Re-mote users need to query data 
hosted in cloud for auditing, processing or other operations. 
Queries could be utilized to perform attacks for the following 
reasons:  
a). These queries and queried results would go 
through    Internet connection where eavesdroppers 
would sit in the middle to obtain these results.  
 
b). Cloud provider themselves are untrusted. The 
query processing procedures are transparent to cloud 
providers. Thus even if the original data is 
transformed and stored inside, and the same query is 
transformed to different values each time and sent to 
the cloud environment, cloud providers would still 
obtain some information from it.[18] 
 
c). Priori knowledge about the data which could be 
obtained from open resources could be combined 
with the analytical results to infer valuable 
information. 
 
B. Data Storage 
In cloud environment, users’ data are stored in remote 
virtu-al machine instances in possession of cloud providers. 
Ac-cording to [1], there could be various outside attacks over 
virtual machines including malicious codes attack, compro-
mising the corresponding Virtual Machine Monitor etc. Be-
sides the outside attack, users lack of physical control of their 
data. Insiders of cloud providers could clearly see what is 
stored in their virtual machine instances.  It would be a ca-
tastrophe if the insiders of cloud providers collude with ad-
versaries to intentionally modify or leak customers’ data.  
Data storage security includes confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. For data confidentiality, how to prevent 
information leakage and efficiently check data integrity over 
large amount of data stored in cloud remains a question. The 
goal here is to minimize the probability to recover the origi-nal 
data obtained from the compromised cloud storage sys-tem. 
For data integrity, adversaries as well as cloud providers 
would modify the data intentionally. An efficient integiry 
checking over large amount of data is necessary.  
As of data availability, both system maintainance and at-
tacks would cause customers’ data to be unavailable. 
. 
IV. DATA CONFIDENTIALITY AND AVAILABILITY 
PROTECTION METHODS 
A. File distribution in multiple storages. 
Multiple storages are applied to minimize the information 
leakage when a single storage is compromised. With this 
method, encryption is not needed. Table 2 summarizes several 
existing methods of multiple storages.  
TABLE 2 MULTIPLE STORAGE METHODS 
Splitting 
Methods 
Distribution Reconstruction 
Maximum 
relative entropy 
splitting[16] 
To multiple 
machine 
instances in the 
same cloud 
All the pieces of data 
Polynomial 
interpolation[1
9] 
To multiple 
clouds 
Only k out of n pieces of 
data 
Divide and 
Conquer[21] 
Random 
distributed to 
multiple cloud 
providers 
All the pieces of data 
 
 
[16] proposes an optimal data splitting and distribution 
algorithms to minimize the useful informational content 
contained in each file chunk stored in different virtual storage. 
For each file chunk ci and the entire file f, the goal of splitting 
is to have the largest relative entropy I(f,ci), which is the 
information lost when ci is used to approximate f. In order to 
reconstruct f, one needs to find the correct set of virtual 
storages among all the virtual storage volumes, and the correct 
sequence of file chunks among all the file chunks in that set of 
virtual storage volumes. For insider attack, one would know 
the storage set, but not the sequence. The distribution of files 
is to minimize the successful recovery probability.  
     However, there are certain problems for this method: a). 
Additional information like the index of each chunk needs to 
be stored in private cloud. b). The corruption of single piece of 
data would lead to the corruption of the entire file, additional 
backups are needed. Tradeoff between confidentiality and 
availability exists. c). The splitting algorithm proposed is not 
efficient, instead dynamic programming could be used. d) 
Data processing is not discussed in this paper.  
In [19], the secret sharing scheme “(k, L, n)-threshold 
scheme” is used to compute and distribute the file to different 
clouds, where k is the required number of shares needed to 
recover the original file, L is the data size of saved file in each 
cloud, and n is the shares of files to be distributed. The 
original data D is divided into Di through a random k-1 degree 
[20]. 
 q(x) = a0 + a1 x +ak-1xk-1                                                     (1) 
where a0=D, Dn=q(n). Compared with method in [16], no 
additional information is needed to store in local machine. File 
could still be recovered with at most n-k pieces of file 
corruption. However, there are still problems with this method: 
a). Rely on a single cloud is not a good idea, since cloud 
provider is untrusted, and they could easily recover the file by 
getting all the pieces of file chunks stored in it. b). It has high 
complexity if the file size is in order of Terabytes.  
In [21], the hierarchical organization from bottom to top is 
data storage nodes, data processing nodes and a Command and 
Control node which is needed to keep track of which piece of 
file resides in which storage node.  A small subset of data 
which contains little information resides in each leaf storage 
node.  There are still several problems with this method. 
 a) Data processing is mentioned in this method, however it 
is before storage, and also it needs decryption first before 
processing.  
b) The splitting method simply divide file to extremely 
small pieces. This minimize the informal contents contained in 
each piece but needs sufficiently large number of machine 
instances compared to method [16]. 
 
B. Processing over encrypted data 
In the above section, multiple storages are applied to secure 
data confidentiality by minimizing information contained in 
each storage node.  However, in the case of data computation, 
the above method is not applicable. Since for data processing 
in cloud, each piece of data needs to contain computable 
information. A better solution might be computing while 
keeping data encrypted. 
Craig Gentry [22] first proposes a “fully homomorphic 
encryption” (FHE) scheme to compute over encrypted data.  
FHE is a scheme that operates on ciphertexts so as to add, 
subtract, and multiply the underlying messages. It consists of 
key generation, encryption, decryption and evaluation 
algorithms. Each evaluation function is associated with a 
function f(m1,m2,…,mt) which could be represented as a 
computable combination of original texts m1,m2,…,mt.  This 
encrypted function f is what is sent to cloud for computation. 
This method has the following problems: 1) FHE needs 
running evaluation algorithm on the decryption function of a 
constructed bootstrappable homomorphic encryption scheme 
first. However, this is computationally expensive. 2) It is less 
efficient than lattic-based scheme. 
Later on, this FHE method is improved. [24] brought up a 
probabilistic decryption algorithm that can be implemented 
with an algebraic circuit of low multiplicative degree to enable 
faster FHE. In [25], FHE protocol for multiple users is 
designed. In [27], detailed implementation of basic operators 
including addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, 
relation is discussed with logical circuits and algorithms. 
Based on that, data structure like array, link list, stack, queue 
etc., and the corresponding operations to these data structures 
are discussed. The timing evaluation is given in the end.   
Built on top of homomorphic encryption, more advanced 
processing techniques are developed. In [23], CtyptDB is 
proposed which enables SQL query processing over encrypted 
data. It is under the following assumptions 1). Query and 
query results would not be changed. 2) The proxy issuing 
queries including the encrypted data is reliable. 3) The DBMS 
is not trusted. This applies to cloud environment since the 
DBMS in possession of cloud providers could not be trusted. 
The difference is that queries would be intercepted by 
adversaries sitting in the middle between users and cloud 
environment. 
In CryptDB, adjustable query based encryption is applied. 
That is, different operation sets have different encryption 
security strength layers. And in the original table, each column 
would be transformed with different encryption methods 
involving Random, Deterministic, Order Preserved, 
Homomorphic, Join and Search encryption in different 
operation sets. Operation sets include Equation, Order, Search 
and Addition sets. One method of Random encryption is by 
using chaining cypher with a different random initialization 
vector each time. In [18], a detailed Order preserved 
encryption with random space perturbation is introduced. This 
is to expand the record with two additional dimensions by a 
deterministic dimension and random generated dimension.  
Similar to CryptDB, in [27], MONOMI is designed to 
query over encrypted data. However, compared to CryptDB, it 
could afford more analytical queries.  
Moreover, Raphael Bost et.al [28], construct hyperlanes 
decision, Naive Bayes, and decision tree classification over 
encrypted data based on additively homomorphic encryption 
with public/private key scheme. MrCrypt[31] provides static 
analysis for secure cloud computations. Crypsis[32] has 
practical confidentiality preserving Big Data Analysis 
 
V. DATA INTEGRITY PROTECTION METHODS 
According to [30], data integrity attacks in cloud includes 
Data Modification Attack, Tagforgery and Data Leakage 
Attack,  Replay and Timeliness Attack, Roll-Back Attack and 
Collusion Attack and Byzantine Attack. 
     Cong Wang et al [26] achieve data integrity by utilizing 
precomputed token.  The original file is represented by m 
column vectors in Galois Field. This file would be encrypted 
by multiplying with a certain matrix to achieve additional k 
parity check vectors. Thus, the encrypted file contains m+k 
columns in total. Further computation would be done over the 
last k parity check columns to protect the confidentiality. At 
the end the encrypted m columns and the modified last k 
parity check columns are sent to store in cloud. The 
encryption has additive homomorphic encryption attributes, 
which enables efficient updates of the file.  
On each encrypted vector, if t times of verification is need-ed. 
Each time, a token is computed using partial blocks of data in 
the vector, thus (m+k)t tokens are precomputed in total.  In 
order to verify the integrity of the file, the index would be sent 
to cloud storage, and same computation procedure on that 
partial data is done to generate the signature, which would be 
sent back and compare with the original token. Thus, if file 
corruption occurs, the corrupted location would be known.  
This is mathematical approach of integrity checking is in data 
level. However, there are certain problems with this method:  
 
a). All precomputed tokens need to be stored in local 
environment. Although the paper mentions that it could be 
stored in remote cloud, the untrusted cloud providers would be 
able to modify it.   
b) Since the tokens are not generated on all parts of the file, it 
could only provide probabilistic integrity assurance. 
 
     In [14], a Trusted Cloud Computing Platform (TCCP) 
based on trusted computing is proposed to protect 
confidentiality and integrity. The trusted platform module is 
implemented in each node. However, since users don’t have 
control over the physical machines, remote attestation is 
needed to ensure that measurement indeed comes from the 
VM which users are running applications on. In each virtual 
machine, trusted platform module (TPM) is embedded and a 
trusted virtual machine monitor (TVVM) is installed during 
the booting. Besides, an external trusted coordinator (TC) is 
used to do the attestation.  The virtual nodes need to register 
with TC. 
     According to [29], Intel already has Intel Trusted 
Execution Technology (TXT) based on the TPM. It is 
compatible with OpenStack which is a open-source software 
platform for cloud computing.  In it, and OpenAttestaion 
server is responsible for communicating with the trusted 
computing pool of hardware and software. 
      However, with trusted cloud computing, application level 
attack would not be determined. For example, if data stored in 
database are compromised. It would not be detected. In order 
to use TCCP, additional application level security needs to be 
implemented 
 
VI. DATA PRIVACY PROTECTION METHODS 
In [4], data privacy against data mining is kept by distributing 
data to different cloud providers. Thus, data analytics based on 
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each part in one cloud might be misleading. For example, 
prediction made on the overall data file could be different 
from that made on each part.  However, this kind of approach 
would not protect each individual’s sensitive data. For 
example, a database contains columns of username and the 
corresponding income.  If the file is simply divided by rows as 
in [4], each individual’s income information is still leaked. 
   In [9], anoymization is applied. A unique indexing of each 
row in databased is generated by hashing of the unique 
identifiers of each row. The hashing information needs to be 
kept locally, and table after removal of these unique identifiers 
would be split by columns to different cloud providers.  In this 
way, individual privacy is kept, however since a whole 
column will be stored in one cloud, possible data mining 
attacks could be applied to predict useful information. 
   In [18], a scalable local recoding method is proposed, which 
could minimize data distortion. However, by generalizing the 
records, queries over stored data might not be that effective. 
VII. DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECURE 
WITH PROTETION METHODS 
In this section, a cloud computing architecture involving 
multiple clouds with data security and privacy protection is 
proposed..  
A.  Threat model and System Architecture 
As shown in Figure 2, multiple cloud systems are applied. The 
data is divided to be sent based on its secret level and operations 
needed over the data. The secret level includes top secret, secret 
and unclassified. The operations on data includes no operations, 
basic operations including simple addition, subtraction, 
multiplication and division, and advanced analytics 
 
 
Fig. 2. Multiple Hierarchical Cloud infrastructure with a common API 
  
 Within each cloud, a hierarchical organization of machine 
instances is applied. According to [1], based on Bayesian 
probabilistic access from bottom to top layer machines, data in 
the highest level has the highest confidentiality.  
Here, a PaaS cloud model is considered. As shown in the 
figure, data could be sent to multiple layers of machine 
instances across different cloud providers.  The cloud 
environment itself would apply trusted cloud computing 
discussed above.   
It’s known that there is not a system which could be fully 
trustworthy. Tradeoff exists among cost, efficiency and 
security. For top secret level, it is better to store locally, and 
for unclassified data, it could be stored directly to a single 
cloud platform without encryption. In Table 3, different 
protection mechanisms over secrete data are summarized. 
 
TABLE 3 
PROTECTION OF SECRET DATA WITH DIFFERENT OPERATIONS 
Operations Representative 
applications 
Possible Protection methods 
No operations Backup service, 
e.g. dropbox 
 
Multiple storage [16] 
Basic 
Operations 
Database 
 
CryptDB [17] 
Advanced 
Analytics 
Machine learning Additively homomorphic 
encryption[28], 
Cripsis [32] 
 
 
 
In this architecture, the local user side is considered as 
trusted party, the interaction between user and cloud, and the 
multiple cloud providers themselves are all untrusted. 
In terms of different secret level and operations needed, a 
common preprocessing API is defined for anonymization, 
authentication, processing data with different operations and 
secret level etc. The input to the common API is data to be sent, 
secret level and computation difficulty. Upon receiving a request 
from user, the common API would further call the functions in 
libraries to perform the correspond operations. It would refer to 
and update local database. For example, if an input is (data, secret, 
no operations).  The common API would further call the data 
splitting and distribution library and also update the local 
database to store the file chunk location information.  
 
B.  Security Evaluation 
     For different cloud providers, its ranking and cost are 
different. Also for different methods, the overall performance 
including time complexity T, cost C, security S and privacy P 
level are different. In order to evaluate a method with the 
overall performance, a weighted linear ranking is proposed as 
follows: 
Pr= a1×   T+a2×   C +a3×   S +a4×   P                                            (2) 
where ai is adjustable weight. The time complexity needs to be 
evaluated per algorithm base. The cost could be measured 
through the billing system of cloud providers. For data 
security and privacy in cloud, it is kind of overlapping. 
Because if encryption is used, as long as the data is 
confidential, the sensitive information will not be disclosed. In 
addition, the data mining attacks would be mitigated. Thus, 
here only  data security is considered.  
Data security includes data availability, integrity and 
confidentiality. Data availability would be compromised in 
two main categories in cloud. First is the cloud architecture 
reliability, i.e. the regular maintenance and failure of machine 
instances. The other comes from attacks talked above.  
For data confidentiality, there are three layers of 
confidentiality in the proposed architecture. In order to 
recover data, one needs to bypass the authentication of a cloud 
platform. Inside the cloud platform, hierarchical access to data 
is required. The encrypted information disclosed is partial. 
Thus, the non-confidentiality Level Probability of Accessing 
one of the cloud service * Hierarchically Access Probability 
that the original information contained in the virtual machine.   
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. Conclusions 
     This paper focuses on the data storage and computation 
security and privacy. Different methods are compared, problems 
and advantages with the existing methods are discussed.  A 
hierarchical multi-cloud architecture with a common 
preprocessing API and local database to deal with anonymization, 
authentication, processing data with different operations and 
secret level is proposed. 
B. Future work 
     The proposed architecture could provide various security 
methods according to the data type and usage to reduce the 
complexity by calling a common API. However, there are 
some problems with this design to be solved: 
 a). The call to the common API would be intensive, thus 
caching and scalable procedures are needed. 
 b). Although most storage and computation are done in 
remote cloud, the preprocessing and certain data related 
information need to be stored and maintained locally.  
c). Since algorithms over encrypted data are applied, 
customer-oriented algorithms need to be developed. Users 
need have a good knowledge of encrypted data. 
d). A fully functional benchmark for the system need to be 
designed, implemented and evaluated with quantitative and 
qualitative performance metrics.  
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